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INTRODUCTION
Contrary to the State's portrayal of the issue on appeal, this case threatens
personal pri vacy interests, freedom ii 01 i 1 ii itrusive searches and seizures, and the sanctity
of the home. The State contends that this case addresses the innocuous issue of whether
the police must futilely stand and wait in front of an open door before executing a search
warrant To the contrary, this case turns on the long-standing constitutional principle
vJiu*!' p'otiibih tlu polii c Iron MiiiitoHitteh nitaip" a home and ' i U nth yrabbint; an
occupant in the absence of exigent circumstances. The controlling law affirms this
requirement and invalidates the violent entry here. Such forceful police tactics violate

interests in their homes, preventing violence, and avoiding property damage. Because
exigent circumstances do not support the violent police entry here, this Court must
reverse Mr. Floor's conviction to remedy the illegal police conduct.

NO SAFETY CONCERNS, FEARS FOR THE
DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE, OR ANY OTHER
EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES SUPPORTED THE
POLICE OFFICERS' VIOLENT ENTRY AND
DETENTION.
In serving a search warrant, the Fourth Amendment bars the police from
announcing their presence and then immediately reaching inside a dwelling and violently
grabbing an occupant absent exigent circumstances. To use force without waiting for a
response, the police must have a reasonable suspicion that waiting would be dangerous
or futile, or would inhibit an investigation such as through the destruction of evidence.
None of those circumstances existed when Mr. Floor's wife, Connie, took a "half-step"
backwards when the police announced their presence and purpose. R. 129: 22. The
police violated the right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures when they
immediately entered the home, forcibly grabbed Connie, and instigated a struggle with
Mr. Floor.

A.

An Open Door Does Not Justify the Police
Dispensing With Their Duty to Wait Before
Entering a Residence and Then Violently
Restraining the Occupants Absent Exigent
Circumstances,

No exigent circumstances supported the police officers' violent conduct. Initially,
the State overly restricts the issue on appeal when it claims that this case "turns on
whether [the officers] failed to wait a reasonable time before they entered, rendering the
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search unreasonable." State's Brief at 9. In so portraying the issue, the State completely
fails to address the serious intrusion here: Det. Teerlink's immediate reaching inside the
home and grabbing Connie. As even the State concedes, in the absence of exigent
circumstances, the knock-and-announce rule requires the police to announce their
presence and to wait a reasonable period of time before entering a residence. State's
Brief at 8. Thus, this appeal raises the issue of whether the "circumstances" justified Det.
Teerlink's immediate entry and violent response. Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385,
394(1997).
On appeal, the State argues a new theory to justify Det. Terrlink's actions.
Specifically, the State argued below that Connie's half-step raised officer safety concerns
and the possible destruction of evidence. Instead, on appeal, the State cites several cases
to argue that the police need not wait "after the door has been opened and announcement
made." State's Brief at 9 (principally citing United States v. Kemp. 12 F.3d 1140, 1141
(D.C. Cir. 1994)). According to the State, once Connie opened the door and the police
officers announced their presence, "the objectives of the knock-and-announce rule had
been achieved. No reason remained for further delay. Indeed, such delay would have
been futile." State's Brief at 11. Based on this reasoning, the State concludes that Det.
Teerlink properly reached inside the home and forcibly grabbed Connie. State's Brief at
11-18.
But, the State's authorities do not address the specific issue presented in this
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appeal; namely, whether Det. Teerlink legally reached inside the home without waiting
and violently grabbed Connie. Mr. Floor does not dispute that the police can
immediately enter a home to peacefully serve a search warrant after announcing their
presence and purpose when an occupant is standing next to an open front door.
However, none of the State's cases address whether a half-step backwards establishes an
exigency that supports immediately reaching inside a residence and forcibly restraining
the occupant. Rather, those cases endorsed the police "peaceably" entering residences
and did not involve any violence on the occupants. Kemp 12 F.3d at 1141; accord
United States v. Hardin. 106 Fed. Appx. 442, 445 (6 th Cir. 2004) (unpublished); State v.
Richards, 962 P.2d 118, 120-21 (Wash. 1998) (en banc); see also Adcock v.
Commonwealth, 967 S.W.2d 6, 11 (Ky. 1998) (adopting police officers' version of facts
that included no force).
Moreover, the principal case upon which the State relies, Kemp, is of questionable
applicability. The court in that case specifically described its holding as "a narrow one"
12 F.3d at 1143. In particular, that court addressed whether the police violated the
federal knock and announce statute which allows a police officer to "'break open any
outer or inner door or window of a house . . . to execute a search warrant if, after notice
of his authority and purpose, he is refused admittance. . .'" Id. at 1141 (quoting U.S.C.A.
§ 3109). The court held that the police did not "'break open'" a door under the
circumstances of that case. IcL In so holding, the court went to great lengths to limit its
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ruling to the specific factual situation of "[w]hen a police officer knocks (with only
reasonable force) at the door of a premises for which he has a warrant, the door opens as
a result, and he announces his presence and purpose to the occupant therein...." IcL_ at
1143. Because the court expressed no opinion about whether a breaking would occur
under different circumstances, this holding's application to this case is tenuous, at best.
Id
The State presents no other authority to support the use of force based on an
ambiguous "half-step" backwards. R. 129: 22. Even the State's own authority concludes
that "retreating a few steps" upon hearing that the police are serving a search warrant was
ambiguous because it could mean either that a person is "permitting the officers entry or
denying officers entry." Hardin, 106 Fed. Appx. at 445. A half-step would be even less
meaningful than several steps in response to an announcement of a search warrant.
In contrast to the absence of authority supporting the State's arguments, this
Court's opinion in State v. Beavers, 859 P.2d 9 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), demonstrates the
illegality of Det. Teerlink's violent entry. In that case, the police responded to a report of
a loud argument in an apartment. IcL at 10. Two police officers listened to the argument
outside the apartment door and heard people arguing about the prices of overcoats. IcL at
11. One of the occupants then stated that he was leaving, opened the front door, and saw
the police officers. Id. The person stated "Oh, shit" and then "stepped back across the
threshold about half an arm length into the apartment." IcL One of the police officers
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then reached inside the apartment, grabbed the person's shoulder, flipped his legs out
from under him, and placed him in a prone position on the ground. IcL_ After seizing the
suspect, the police officer saw other people inside the apartment fumbling with the coats
and fleeing the scene. IdL
This court ruled that the police lacked exigent circumstances to support a
warrantless search. Id at 18-19. This court held that the overriding question required it
to "determine whether [the] police reasonably believed that they were at substantial risk
at the time of the entry." Id at 19. Stated differently, this court ruled that a reasonable
belief "must of necessity arise before the challenged entry." Id^ at 18. For this reason,
the "police cannot create the exigency in order to justify a warrantless search." Id,
Applying these principles to the facts in that case, this court ruled that the police
officer who initially entered the apartment had no legitimate fear for his safety when he
entered.1 The police officer did not become concerned until after he had entered the
apartment, seized the suspect, and then saw others fleeing. Id. at 19. This court
concluded that because the officer's fears "did not arise as a result of1 the suspect's halfarm length movement backwards, exigent circumstances did not justify the intrusion. I d
Implicit in this ruling, this Court necessarily concluded that the suspect's surprise and

Recently, the Utah Supreme Court altered the standard for reviewing mixed
questions of law and fact in search and seizure cases. Utah courts now review such
questions for correctness under the totality of the circumstances rather than affording trial
courts some deference. State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95,1J15, 103 P.3d 699.
6

initial movement backwards upon seeing the police did not establish exigent
circumstances either. Id
This ruling strongly supports that Connie's half-step backwards was no more
alarming than the suspect's half-arm's length movement back in Beavers. Although
Beavers involved a warrantless search it applies with equal force to this case because that
case, just like this one, required this court to determine whether exigent circumstances
supported the officers' immediate entry. IcL As in this case, this inquiry raised the
question of whether the police officers reasonably believed "that they were at substantial
risk at the time of the entry." ML at 19; see State v. Peterson, 2005 UT 17,fflj30-31,
P.3d

(police cannot create an exigency by performing acts not requested by

defendant).
The Beavers analysis and holding readily translate to the facts of this case. Like
the suspect's surprise in Beavers at the sight of the police, Connie's half-step backwards
occurred in response to her learning that the men at her door were police officers serving
a search warrant. This minor movement, without more, objectively would not cause a
"reasonable belief that the person was fleeing to retrieve a weapon or destroy evidence.
Beavers. 859 P.2d at 19. Even the State's own case holds that such movement alone may
indicate "permitting the officers entry. . . . " Hardin, 106 Fed. Appx. at 445; see also
United States v. Rideau. 969 F.2d 1572, 1575 (5 th Cir. 1992).

7

B.

Adopting the State's Approach Would Violate
Cherished Constitutional Rights and
Undermine the Policies Underlying the Knockand-Announce Rule.

The State's interpretation of the knock-and-announce rule seriously undermines
individual privacy rights and the sanctity of the home. The Utah Supreme Court recently
reiterated, 'The right to be free of unreasonable searches and seizures is one of the most
cherished rights guaranteed by the Utah and United States Constitutions." Brigham City
v. Stuart, 2005 UT, 13, f 15, 519 Utah Adv. Rep. 17. In direct opposition to this holding,
the State's view allows the police to forcibly reach inside a dwelling and restrain the
occupants without waiting, whenever the police serve a search warrant and have
announced their purpose and presence. This analysis would render the knock-andannounce rule "meaningless." United States v. Banks. 540 U.S. 31, 41 (2003).
This case presents an even more serious violation of privacy rights because it
occurred inside a home. "Nowhere is [the freedom from unreasonable searches and
seizures] more zealously guarded than in a person's home, which is one of the four
domains expressly granted the security promised by the Fourth Amendment." Stuart,
2005 UT 13,1J15. In Stuart, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed this court's decision that
the police lacked exigent circumstances to enter a home without a warrant even though
the police could see several adults scuffling with a juvenile and trying to calm the
situation. Id at ^[35-37. In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court held that,
despite the apparent violence, the police were required to knock before entering the
8

residence given the "deeply rooted and statutory dignity afforded a dwelling." IcL_ at f37.
If a potentially violent encounter inside a home does not support exigent circumstances, a
mere half-step backwards would surely appear not to justify the police officers'
immediate entry and grabbing in this case.
Moreover, the State's proposed approach undermines the policies that form the
constitutional foundations for the knock-and-announce rule. First, as just discussed,
authorizing the police to violently grab persons once they announce their purpose and
presence directly violates "'the protection of an individual's private activities within his
[or her] home....'" Statev.Ribe. 876 P.2d 403, 406-07 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting
State v. Buck. 756 P.2d 700, 701 (Utah 1988)). The State dismisses this concern by
arguing that a police announcement of a search warrant directly to an occupant allows the
police to enter immediately because the notice defeats any expectation of privacy in one's
home. State's Brief at 12. But, this contention relies on the State's false assumption that
this case merely involves an immediate entry and overlooks its overly restricted argument
that fails to acknowledge the police officers' use of violence.
Second, just as occurred in this case, allowing the police to immediately enter and
employ violence in the absence of exigent circumstances increases the risk of "Violence
and physical injury to both police and occupants.. ..'" IcL (quoting Buck. 756 P.2d at
701). Here, Det. Teerlink's violent conduct not only resulted in an attack on Connie but
also escalated the violence when Mr. Floor tried to protect his wife. The violence

9

continued unabated when Det. Cutler proceeded to tackle Mr. Floor. Again, the State
dismisses the violence in this case by relying on its fallacious view that this case merely
involved an announcement followed by an immediate entry. According to the State, no
risk of violence can be attributed to the police because they "announced their authority
and purpose," therefore, Mr. Floor had no reason to be surprised at the police officers'
entry. State's Brief at 13-14.
But, like the trial judge below, the State errs in focusing on Mr. Floor's actions in
assuming the legality of the entry. As established above and in the opening brief, this
Court must evaluate the reasonableness of the police officers' conduct "at the time of the
entry." Beavers, 859 P.2d at 19; see also cases cited in Appellant's Brief at 16. The
police officers indisputably testified that they entered in response to Connie's "half-step"
backwards and not in response to anything that Mr. Floor did. R. 129: 6, 15, 17-18, 22.
Mr. Floor's "after the fact" actions are simply irrelevant to this appeal. Ribe. 876 P.2d at
415; see also Beavers, 859 P.2d at 19 (police cannot create an exigency that arises after
an initial illegal entry).
The State similarly misapplies the law on the police officers' use of violence on
Connie. In its only discussion of Det. Teerlink's violent grabbing of Connie, the State
contends that "it is well-settled that police may secure occupants of a home in executing a
search warrant...." State's Brief at 14. The State cites Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S.
692, 705 (1981), for this proposition. But, Summers has no application here. That case
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addressed whether the police legally met an occupant to a house on the front steps,
required him to grant the police access to the house, and then detained him while they
searched the house. IdL at 693. The Court explicitly stated, "The dispositive question in
this case is whether the initial detention of respondent violated his constitutional right to
be secure against an unreasonable seizure of his person." Id. at 694. In answer to this
question, the Court held that the police "had the authority to require [the occupant] to reenter the house and to remain there while they conducted their search. IcL at 695.
In contrast, this case requires this Court to assess whether the police followed the
knock-and-announce rule in immediately entering the premises and violently restraining
Connie without giving her an opportunity to peaceably allow the police to enter.
Summers did not address the knock-and-announce rule or whether exigent circumstances
justified the police in dispensing with their duty to wait. In contrast to that case, the
police officers here claimed that they employed force only in response to a step
backwards, not to gain entry to the residence as in Summers. The police unquestionably
could have entered the home through the open door. But, unlike Summers , this appeal
challenges the officers' entry without waiting and their apparently unnecessary use of
violence on Connie.
Third, Mr. Floor does not argue that the police offices' entry caused any property
damage. But, he wishes to clarify a point in the State's brief. The State takes issue with
Mr. Floor's characterization of the police officers' entry as "forcible" and pressumes that
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this adjective refers to the property. State's Brief at 17. Mr. Floor's reference to force
addresses the violence Det. Teerlink employed on Connie to enter the residence. Mr.
Floor clearly conceded in his opening brief that no significant damage occurred to the
house in this case. Appellant's Brief at 29.
Because no exigent circumstances supported the immediate entry and the use of
violence, this Court must reverse Mr. Floor's convictions and order the suppression of
the contraband that the police illegally obtained. Ribe, 876 P.2d at 404, 410, 412. The
State does not even argue the suppression issue. Instead, it rests its entire brief on its
false assumption that the police may immediately enter a residence and forcibly restrain
the occupants absent exigent circumstances. Based on the sound arguments in the
opening brief and this Court's decision in Ribe, this Court must reverse Mr. Floor's
convictions and suppress the State's evidence.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Floor requests this Court to reverse the trial judge's denial of his motion to
suppress and to order the trial judge to suppress the fruits of the illegal search.
Dated this 3?^day of April, 2005.

^~%^

— ^ ^ ^ ^

KENT R. HART
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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